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Extreme right-wing terrorism has currently become a wide-spread phenomenon across the 
world while the global focus has been on deadly terrorist activities with radical Salafist-Islamist 
aspirations since September 11, 2001. One of the latest attacks in Halle, an eastern city, 
organized by a young white German citizen against a Synagogue on the Yom Kippur Day, led 
to the death of two people on 9 October 2019. Another deadly attack in Christchurch, New 
Zealand, organized by a white supremacist person against Muslims attending the Friday prayer 
in a mosque murdering 51 Muslims on 15 March 2019 seem to have strong parallels with the 
murder of 79 Norwegian youngsters by another white supremacist, Behring Breivik in Norway 
on 22 July 2011. This Working Paper scrutinizes the social-anthropological and psychological 
sources of white supremacism on a global scale. This paper derives from the ongoing EU-
funded research for the “Prime Youth” project conducted under the supervision of the Principle 
Investigator, Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, and funded by the European Research Council with the 




AYHAN KAYA  
Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics of Interculturalism  
Director, European Institute  





“Nativism, Islamophobism and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalisation 
and Religionisation of what is Social, Economic and Political in Europe” 
 
 
This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European 
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme grant agreement no. 785934. 
 
About the ERC Advanced Grant Project: PRIME Youth  
 
This research analyses the current political, social, and economic context of the European 
Union, which is confronted by two substantial crises, namely the global financial crisis and the 
refugee crisis. These crises have led to the escalation of fear and prejudice among the youth 
who are specifically vulnerable to discourses that culturalise and stigmatize the “other”. Young 
people between the ages of 18 to 30, whether native or immigrant-origin, have similar responses 
to globalization-rooted threats such as deindustrialization, isolation, denial, humiliation, 
precariousness, insecurity, and anomia. These responses tend to be essentialised in the face of 
current socio-economic, political and psychological disadvantages. While a number of 
indigenous young groups are shifting to right-wing populism, a number of Muslim youths are 
shifting towards Islamic radicalism. The common denominator of these groups is that they are 
both downwardly mobile and inclined towards radicalization. Hence, this project aims to 
scrutinize social, economic, political and psychological sources of the processes of 
radicalization among native European youth and Muslim-origin youth with migration 
background, who are both inclined to express their discontent through ethnicity, culture, 
religion, heritage, homogeneity, authenticity, past, gender and patriarchy. This project has 
received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s 
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme grant agreement no. 785934. 
 
For more information, please visit the project Website: https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr 
@BilgiERC  @BilgiERC 
 
 
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3482912  
THE ERC IN A NUTSHELL 
 
The European Research Council, set up by the EU in 2007, is the premiere European funding 
organisation for excellent frontier research. Every year, it selects and funds the very best, 
creative researchers of any nationality and age, to run projects based in Europe. The ERC offers 
four core grant schemes: Starting, Consolidator, Advanced and Synergy Grants. With its 
additional Proof of Concept grant scheme, the ERC helps grantees to bridge the gap between 
grantees’ pioneering research and early phases of its commercialisation.  
 





















A vast amount of social science research has been dedicated to the study of Islamist terrorism, 
to uncover its psychological and structural drivers. The recent revival of extreme-right wing 
terrorism now points at the need to investigate this re-emerging phenomenon. Yet, most 
research still focuses on understanding and predicting political behaviours related to right wing 
populism, which is problematic. Drawing on insights from social anthropology and social 
psychology, this paper proposes to highlight some of the characteristics of extreme-right wing 
terrorism. To do so, we first explore similarities between these two terrorist groups. We start 
by reviewing evidence showing a visible co-radicalization pattern between Islamist and 
extreme-right factions in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. After describing the social-
psychological commonalities that underlie co-radicalization between those two factions, we 
discuss of their social-anthropological peculiarities. We conclude that symmetrical 
psychological mechanisms pertaining to threat regulation underpin right wing and Islamist 
terrorism. Still, each type of terrorism can only be properly understood through studying 
specific factors linked with commitment of their actors to different socio-historically 
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A general trend of political extremization can be observed across the globe. This is indicated 
by numerous electoral successes of populist parties in the EU and the US, the 
authoritarian/hawkish shift of governments in ‘illiberal democracies’ such as Russian 
Federation, Brazil, India and Turkey (Berezin, 2009), or even the revival of nationalist 
aspirations in Western democracies such as the Brexit debate in the UK (Kelsey, 2017). It is 
not only political extremism, nativism and right-wing populism, but also violent extremism in 
the form of terrorism is on the rise across the world (START, 2018; Fielitz, 2018; Kruglanski 
et al., 2014).  
Current social-psychological research on extremism points at its increase in the face of threats 
and anxiety in general. In fact, research over the past decades has established that individuals 
react to various threats such as death, exclusion, failure, insecurity and ambiguity by 
extremizing their adherence to ideologies, which may lead to violent intergroup behaviour 
through processes pertaining to threat-regulation (Lieberman et al., 1999; Kay et al., 2009; Xu 
et al., 2018). This is because meaning systems including religions and political ideologies, 
buffer anxiety (Greenberg et al., 1992; Jost, 2017), and provide individuals with feelings of 
living in an understandable/controllable environment in the face of a social world becoming 
more and more uncertain, insecure, chaotic and anomic due to the complexity of the present 
age, characterized with globalization, deindustrialization, unemployment, poverty, 
multiculturalism, diversity and mobility (Whitson and Galinsky, 2008; Proulx et al., 2010; 
Proulx and Inzlicht, 2012; Modest and de König, 2016). Consequently, both violent political 
and religious extremism stem partly from compensatory behaviours aimed at restoring one’s 
sense of purpose in the face of threats and loss of significance (Schumpe et al., 2018). These 
findings make it clear that a threat-regulation approach to violent extremism is a robust 
framework for understanding it (Jonas et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, a comprehensive approach to understand violent extremism in its ecological 
aspects cannot limit its scope to the study of in vitro artificial threats. Though interesting for 
isolating components of the causal process at play, the threat-regulation approach to extremism 
still fails to consider the role of contextual factors such as deindustrialization, unemployment 
and poverty (Kaya, 2012) in defining relevant markers for threat identification (what 
characteristic of the threat is most potent, what are the relevant in/outgroups?) and threat 
resolution (what is the relevant group identity for compensation?).  It also does not take much 
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into account iterative reaction of outgroups in the face of the studied groups’ extremized 
responses (Klandermans, 2014; Kteily et al., 2016), which is why we propose to embed the 
study of extremism in a more dynamic framework. 
Drawing on insights from social-anthropology and social-psychology, this paper will 
investigate the characteristics of extreme-right wing terrorism. To do so, we will first explore 
the commonalities between terrorist groups by describing the way right-wing terrorists and 
Islamist terrorists co-radicalize each other through complex intergroup dynamics. This will 
allow us to discuss the psychological commonalities between terrorist factions, as well as to 
engage in a discussion of their social-anthropological specificities, due to their commitment to 
socio-historically constructed ideological worldviews.  
The Dynamics of Threat-driven extremism 
So far, psychological research has identified that violent extremism stems from existential 
motivations triggered by threat regulation processes (Jonas et al., 2014) at the individual level, 
but also form social identity processes and a need to belong to a particular community of 
sentiments (Verkuyten, 2018) that results in intergroup co-radicalization cycles (Obaidi et al., 
2018). The term co-radicalization comes from the observation that intergroup hostility 
generates intergroup conflicts through ideological extremization, or increases existing ones 
(Pyszczynski et al., 2008). These intergroup conflicts have a propensity to perpetuate 
themselves through cycles of reciprocal threat/violence/extremization (Kteily et al., 2016; 
Kunst et al., 2016). Co-radicalization processes can take many forms in a variety of contexts 
(Pyszczynski et al., 2008). For instance, Klandermans (2014: 18) reports a study of exchanges 
at two different web forums in the Netherlands: a Moroccan (Marokko.NL) forum and an ethnic 
Dutch (NL.politiek) forum. At both networks, participants react to “real-world events” and to 
each other. Figure 2 relates the amount of participation on the forums to identity relevant events 
between October 2003 and April 2006, the period under scrutiny. The amount of participation 
in both forums is expressed as the number of words in the postings about immigration and 
integration. Obviously, the online discussion shows a strong response to the three major events 
during this period. The study’s findings can be seen in Figure 1 and provide an empirical 
illustration for a co-radicalization process between these two groups in the cyberspace. 
 
Figure 1. Attention for immigration and integration issues on two opposing web forums (number of 
words, from Klandermans, 2014). 
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These cycles sometimes lead to intractable conflicts, and explain the parallel rise of antagonistic 
violent extremist factions such as the conflicts between Islamist groups and White 
supremacists. These so-called intergroup co-radicalization processes are stochastic and 
dynamic by nature (Decety et al., 2017). Their very specific properties make them potentially 
harmful in systemic terms, precisely because their interactive features may lead, if not palliated, 
to a progressive polarization and disintegration of the societal structure. Such escalation cycles 
have been anticipated in both United States (Pyszczynski et al., 2003) and Europe in the 
aftermath of 9/11. On the one hand, the recent wave of terrorist attacks in European cities in the 
2010s has created a strong resentment against the liberal refugee policies of some European 
states, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands among them. The actual fear of terrorism 
committed by radical Salafi-Islamist terrorists has triggered the anti-systemic populist and 
nativist resentment against mainstream political parties (Kaya, 2019). On the other hand, for 
instance in Europe, some early analyses indicated that the threatening atmosphere created by 
the far-right parties against the Muslim minorities, could explain, albeit partially, why 
youngsters from Muslim-immigrant backgrounds would increasingly turn to extreme forms of 
religious ideologies (i.e. Wahhabism and Salafism) and, for some of them, to Islamist terrorist 
organizations (Roy, 2017; Taarnby, 2004).  
Introducing the Reciprocal Threat Model (RTM)  
A useful model to study intergroup co-radicalization processes is the Reciprocal Threat Model 
(RTM) from Arciszewski et al. (2008) (See Figure 2). It is not a theoretical model in the proper 
sense, because it does not propose any novel processes to study violent extremism. Instead, this 
model needs to be thought of as a convenient way to represent and organize the different known 
psychological and intergroup mechanisms in the literature that dynamically lead to violent 
extremism. As such, it comprises four major steps, pertaining to the reciprocal responses of 
both native populations (ethnic/cultural majority group) and populations with a migration 
background (Kaya, 2012).  
Accordingly, societal threats (e.g. terror attacks), generate feelings of powerlessness, loss of 
control, anxiety and uncertainty among targeted groups such as native populations in the case 
of terror attacks (Step 1) (Pyzsczynski et al., 2003; Lerner et al., 2003; Jonas et al., 2014; 
Vasilopoulos, 2018). Threats, therefore, generate increased feelings of anomia, a syndrome 
which encompasses perceptions of normlessness appearing in  the form of sensations of ‘chaos’, 
the belief that norms do not regulate behaviours efficiently, or the assumption that the world is 
unjust and meaningless, and that the future is hopeless (Seeman, 1959; Smith and Bohm, 2008, 
Levina et al., 2018). 
This syndrome of anomia, in turn, leads to ideological extremization because it drives 
individuals to cling to their (often) national in-group and to view ‘others’ (e.g.. groups not 
considered as part of the national community) as threatening (Proulx et al., 2012; Jonas et al., 
2014; Xu and Mc Gregor, 2018). Consequently, this extremization inevitably leads to changes 
in the socio-political context such as higher support for authoritarian candidates, harsher 
immigration policies, reinforcement of law and order, and/or vigilantism (Step 2) (Pyzsczynski 
et al., 2003; Landau et al., 2004; Vasilopoulos, 2017; Brouard et al., 2018).  
These socio-political changes induce a sense of threat through increased exposure to 
discrimination, or increased economic inequalities among identified ‘outgroups’ such as 
populations with migration background. As social isolation and feelings of powerlessness are 
part of anomia, they are also progressively driven to cling to their in-group and to extremization 
as a response to threat in the form of an increased prejudice against the native population and/or 
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increased feelings of disconnection from society in general (Step 3) (Doosje et al., 2013; van 
Bergen et al., 2015).  
These feelings are all known predictors of religious extremism and support for ideologically 
motivated violence (Step 4). This is because violent extremism is a way for individuals to 
restore a sense of significance in life and personal control after experiencing such feelings of 
anomy, insecurity and ambiguity (Kay et al., 2010; Loseman et al., 2013; van Bergen et al., 
2015; Webber et al., 2017). Accordingly, recent investigations have directly and causally linked 
anti-Muslim hostility in Western Europe with increased support for ISIS among the minority 
groups (Mitts, 2019; Kaya, 2019).  
 
Figure 2. Details of the Reciprocal Threat Model’s steps. 1 = Risk/Threat perception, 2 = ideological 
extremization, 3 = Intergroup conflict escalation, 4 = Increased radicalism in response to Loss of 
Significance. 
Applying the RTM to the study of terrorism in the West. 
An important prediction of the RTM is that, ironically, the very socio-political reactions to 
terrorism are themselves a risk factor that increases the likelihood of further violent extremism 
because of their consequences on intergroup relations. In fact, in contrast with the claims that 
terrorism is inefficient in attaining its political goals (Abrahms, 2008; Abrahms et al., 2017), 
the RTM shows that there may be some efficiency in using extremist violence as a way to 
progressively divide target societies at least to facilitate further recruitment and perpetuation of 
intergroup conflicts among them. To illustrate this phenomenon, we decided to replicate 
Ebner’s (2017) analysis which suggests that extreme-right-wing terror attacks are linked with 
Islamist terror attacks (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Frequencies of far-right and Islamist terror attacks from year 2012 to 2016 from Ebner (2017, 
p.153). 
Using the Global Terrorism Database (START, 2018) we extracted the number of terror attacks 
carried out by extreme right-wing groups (nationalists and xenophobic groups) and by Islamist 
groups in Western countries (EU, USA, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Norway and New-
Zealand) from 1986 to 2017 (Figure 4). We excluded independentists and minority-activists as 
well as civil rights and left-wing groups because they are out of scope of the present analysis. 
Figure 4. Frequencies of far-right and Islamist terror attacks from year 1986 to 2016 with examples of 
highly mediatized attacks (from the GTD, START, 2018). 
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database which counts terrorist events 
across the globe (from 1970 to 2018) made available by the START consortium from the 
University of Maryland (see START, 2018). The data is based on reports from diverse media 
sources which have been determined to be credible. It includes data on domestic, transnational 
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and international terrorist attacks (N > 180,000). For each GTD incident, date, location, 
weapons used, target, number of casualties, and –important- on the group responsible for the 
attack. We thus used that last information to code groups which ideology was clearly driven by 
right wing nationalism, anti-Islam prejudice and anti-immigration attitudes (extreme right-wing 
terrorism) or by Islamist ideology (e.g. conducting armed jihad, establishing a caliphate, 
Islamist terrorism). 
As our results show, terrorism is by no means a novel phenomenon, nor is it limited to Islamist 
groups and ideology. It is true however that Islamist-driven terror attacks are now on the rise, 
along with right-wing terrorism which declined significantly from 1995 to 2001. In fact, both 
right-wing and Islamist terrorist attacks seem to display some correlation and respond to one 
another more strongly after the 9/11 attacks. This result was corroborated by time series 
analyses on these standardized, log-transformed and de-trended series (Marzouki and Oullier, 
2015; Troian, Arciszewski and Apostolidis, 2019). The analysis revealed statistically 
significant cross-correlations between our variables only after 9/11 (Figure 5). The frequency 
of Islamist terror attacks becomes predictable and detectable from the frequency of right-wing 
terror attacks only from 2001 and onwards. There might be many reasons behind this 
correlation, or co-radicalization process, ranging from the growing impact of social media 
(Caiani and Parenti, 2013) on radicalization and co-radicalization to the changing definition of 
politics from being about consensus to being about dissensus (Ranciére, 2011: 1), or to the end 
of the social (Latour, 2005). As the reasons of co-radicalization as such deserve a more 
elaborated analysis, the scope of this paper is rather limited with the amplification of the 
dynamics of the processes of co-radicalization between white supremacists and Islamist 
radicals. In other words, co-radicalization between right-wing and Islamist terror groups 
becomes apparent after the year 2001 in Western countries. In line with the RTM, we think that 
this may be due to the socio-political consequences of the 9/11 attacks in the West, which lead 
to increased suspicion of Muslim-origin minorities resulting in discriminatory policies such as 
2004 hijab ban from French schools (Koopmans et al., 2005: 157) and deleterious intergroup 
relations (Kaya, 2012), notwithstanding a significant rise in anti-immigrant resentment as can 
be seen from the electoral successes of various extreme-right-wing parties in those countries. 
 
Figure 5. Cross-correlation patterns between right-wing terror attacks and Islamist terror attacks pre and 
post 2001. Numbers on the x-axis represent lags (months) and those on the y-axis represent correlation 
coefficients.  
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The co-radicalization equation: extreme right as the missing unknown? 
These results show that societal threats can degrade intergroup relations within societies. 
Additionally, degraded intergroup relations further fuel threat perceptions by directly affecting 
the socio-political context in which these groups evolve. These so-called phenomena of 
intergroup co-radicalization (sometimes leading to intractable conflicts) have been increasingly 
described and investigated by social psychologists in the past decade. For instance, key 
identified drivers of intergroup violence range from emotions such as anger (Rydell et al., 2008) 
and perceptions of meta-dehumanization (Kteily et al., 2016) to norm perception (Paluck, 2009) 
and symbolic threats (Obaidi et al., 2018).  
However, such analyses may convey the impression that conflicts occur in a ‘socio-historical 
vacuum’. As we focus on generic processes and reduce the number of parameters under 
investigation, we inevitably render our analyses blind to important aspects of violent extremism. 
One is the crucial role of culture-related content of ideological responses, which may constitute 
an important moderator of threat’s effects upon intergroup reactions. This is why social-
psychological approaches can largely benefit from, and complement sociological and 
anthropological perspectives in the study of such complex phenomena. 
More importantly, analyses and, unfortunately, ongoing events point at the rise of extreme-
right-wing terrorism targeting ethnic and sexual minorities as well as members of left-wing 
groups in the last few years. While we now know both Islamist and white supremacist factions 
co-radicalize with each other, a great deal of research has been allocated to understanding 
Islamist terrorism due to its salience in the West since the 9/11 attacks (Kruglanski et al., 2019). 
In comparison, most analyses of extreme right-wing movements focus on their institutional 
aspects such as right-wing populist parties and the prevalence of racist opinions among the 
general public (Vasilopoulos, 2018; Forscher and Kteily, 2019). Much less is currently known 
on why individuals from Western countries join small neo-Nazi/far-right organizations that 
carry out actual violent acts and terror attacks such as Combat 18 in Germany, the Identity 
Youth in France, or Soldiers of Odin in Belgium and the Netherlands.  
It is a bit as if, rather than studying recruits, or ex-recruits, from ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria) and Al-Qaeda, terrorism researchers had focused only on members of ‘mainstream’ 
political Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Kruglanski et al., 2019) to 
understand jihadi-inspired terrorism. Similarly, it is not clear how studying the reasons making 
regular citizens adhere and vote for right-wing populist parties (Vieten & Poynting, 2016) 
informs us on the determinants of engagement into neo-Nazi violent factions and of carrying 
hate crimes. Though there is a common social-psychological component to both peaceful and 
violent extremists that lead them to embrace similar ideologies as described in our introduction 
section, much research shows that they differ in subtle yet important psychological (Trip et al., 
2019; Adam-Troian et al., 2019) and sociological ways (Jasko et al., 2019). We will therefore 
try to sum up potential explanations as to what motivates individuals to join violent extreme 
right-wing organizations, by drawing on what is already known on violent extremism in general 
and on Islamist extremism. 
Extremism and violence: a tale of two processes. 
There are many factors that push individuals towards engaging in extremist groups performing 
collective action such as communists, pro-environmental activists, and anti-abortion protesters. 
Various factors pertain to a mix of individual and group level processes that mutually interact 
in a dynamic way (Klandermans, 2014). People may join causes because they are driven by 
collective anger (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Collective action attracts individuals if it is 
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perceived as efficient (van Zomeren et al., 2004) to change political decisions that are 
considered unfair (van den Bos, 2018).  
Politics is about managing intergroup relations and differential allocation of resources, and this 
explains why factors linked with social identity plays an important role in predicting collective 
action and ideological extremism (Klandermans, 2014). Individuals’ identification with a group 
that is politically targeted is a potent predictor of protest behaviour on a variety of issues such 
as gender equality (Liss et al., 2004). However, ideological extremism and engagement into 
collective action refer to group-based actions but do not necessarily entail violence. In fact, if 
activism sometimes facilitates radicalization towards violent extremism, these remain two 
distinct constructs (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009). Our focus is on violent extremism, 
which, as mentioned in our introduction, refers to the recourse to violent actions on behalf of a 
political cause.  
Violent extremism is widespread around the world and across the ideological spectrum. Briefly, 
it often serves to restore a sense of meaning, control, justice, honour and dignity in the face of 
perceived threats and humiliations (Kruglanski and Orehek, 2011; Troian et al., 2019; Webber 
et al., 2017). The most recent and exhaustive theoretical framework to understand violent 
extremism is what is referred to as the 3N’s of radicalization: Needs, Narratives and Network 
(Kruglanski et al., 2019). Individuals are likely to engage in political violence depending on its 
prevalence in their own social network (Sageman, 2004), their exposure to legitimization of 
political violence (Atran, 2016), and their motivation to search for a significant purpose in life 
(Kruglanski et al., 2014). Social-psychological investigation of violent extremism has 
highlighted the importance of this latter factor for understanding intentions to engage in violent 
actions. 
In addition to these combined factors, the process of radicalization into violent action includes 
different sequential steps: an action phase during which individuals engage in violent 
behaviour, preceded by a group membership phase which follows a first step called the 
sensitivity phase (Doosje et al., 2016). It is this latter phase that researchers investigate when 
trying to understand how individuals join violent factions, and many studies thus examine 
closely the motivational components that predict a first attitudinal (or behavioural) shift towards 
violent extremism for a given cause, or group.  
From a social-psychological perspective, the motivation towards violent extremism starts with 
the observation that individuals tend to have a positive image of themselves (Rogers, 1951; 
Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988). Experiencing situations of humiliation creates an inconsistency 
between the positive image that one wishes to form, and the reality of this experience 
(McGregor et al., 2001). Thus, individuals will behave in order to reduce anxiety due to the 
discrepancy between an ideal state of self-positive image and the reality of experiencing 
humiliation (Festinger, 1957; Jonas et al., 2014). And, as stated earlier, because worldviews 
(e.g. sets of religious/ideological meaning systems) provide individuals with a sense of meaning 
and control, self-related threats generally lead to cognitive/behavioural extremization (Jonas et 
al., 2014; Xu and McGregor, 2018). This psychological tendency to compensate self-threat 
related anxiety through violent extremization forms the basis for Significance Quest Theory 
(Jasko et al., 2016; Kruglanski et al, 2014). In short, Significance Quest Theory suggests that 
individuals are guided by their fundamental need to feel meaningful. According to this theory, 
violent extremism is the result of a need to restore individual significance, importance and 
effectiveness.  
Relatedly, strong significance loss is associated with an increased extremism among radicalized 
people (Webber et al., 2017). Also, individuals who have experienced significant economic, or 
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relational loss are more likely to engage in violent actions (Jasko et al., 2016). There is now 
ample evidence for a causal role of loss of significance in generating violent political behaviour 
(Jasko et al., 2016; Webber et al. 2017; Schumpe et al., 2018). Furthermore, the idea behind 
significance loss parsimoniously encompasses a range of known predictors of violent 
extremism such as unfairness judgments (van den Bos, 2018), self-uncertainty (Hogg et al., 
2013; Hogg, 2014), or strong anti-police resentment generated by exposure to abusive ‘stop-
and-search’ procedures (Drury et al., 2019).  
On top of the direct humiliation-compensation motives driving the effects of loss of significance 
on violent extremism, research shows that other existential motivations such as pertaining to 
control, freedom, meaning motives (Greenberg et al., 2004; Jonas et al., 2014) underpin 
politically violent behaviour. In fact, significance/meaning is just one of five existential 
concerns that make up a very potent construct for understanding violent extremism: anomia 
(Levina et al., 2018; Meier and Bell, 1959; Merton, 1938; Seeman, 1959, 1975; Smith & Bohm, 
2008; Zhao & Cao, 2010; Teymoori et al., 2016). Anomia is defined as a psychological state 
including feelings of meaninglessness, powerlessness, social isolation, normlessness and self-
estrangement (Smith & Bohm, 2008; Troian et al., 2019).  
A recent study run in Turkey, France, Belgium and Brazil by Adam-Troian and collaborators 
(2019) showed that, in line with Significance Quest Theory and findings from the experimental 
existential psychology literature (Xu & McGregor, 2018), anomia is a predictor of violent 
extremism independently of participants’ political orientation. This individual level construct 
stems from sociological work on anomie, which differs from anomia in that it refers to a societal 
state of normlessness (Durkheim, 1897). But, more importantly, anomia is a specific predictor 
of violent extreme intentions while it is generally not linked with peaceful ‘activism’ intentions 
(Adam-Troian et al., 2019; Adam-Troian and Mahfud, 2019). Research thus points at important 
differences between extremism and violent extremism which pertains to individuals’ levels of 
significance loss, their degree of exposure to violent-legitimizing ideologies (thus their social 
context), and their level of anomia. Also recent evidence shows that violent extremists have 
divergent cognitive features. They have a more dogmatic style (Zmigrod et al., 2019) and their 
moral reasoning is focused on outcomes, not intentionality. They consider morally acceptable 
to try to hurt someone but failing to do so, while they view as immoral to actually have hurt 
someone without intending to (Baez et al., 2017). 
The specificities of Islamist terrorism 
Besides the factors outlined above, which are commonly found across violent extremists, 
Islamist terrorism has some specificities that distinguishes it from other types of terrorism. 
These pertain its ideological content, its global character and its use of suicide bombing 
techniques that are rarely carried out by other types of extremist groups. In fact, the narrative 
propagated by Islamist extremists is peculiar in motivating potential recruits and bolstering their 
members through focusing on some elements rather than others. One salient discursive element 
in the Islamist rhetoric directly taps into victimization, unfairness and discrimination, which are 
potent drivers of loss of significance (Rahimullah et al., 2013). In fact, the Salafi/Wahhabi-
inspired ideology of groups such as ISIS, AL-Qaeda and Boko Haram depicts a struggle 
opposing Western (US and its allies) oppressive military interventions and geopolitical 
decisions towards Muslim countries (Rahimullah et al., 2013). Moreover, through these 
ideological lenses, secular Muslim States are seen as inherently corrupt, treacherous, spreading 
Western values and constituting a Trojan horse pushing forwards the Western ‘neo-colonial and 
imperialist’ agenda. This line of reasoning inevitably leads to the conclusion that armed 
resistance (as opposed to political engagement) is the only viable solution to bring about the 
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emergence of Sharia-ruled Islamic states, which will guarantee Muslims freedom, peace, justice 
and development (Kruglanski et al., 2019). These ideological narrative further fuels feeling of 
injustice, which drive violent extremism (Webber et al., 2017), while at the same time 
generating a strong feeling of identification to the Muslim community (the Umma). These 
combined motivations have two behavioural consequences. 
First, strong identification with the group generates more group fusion and commitment to the 
Islamist worldview (Atran, 2016). More specifically according to Terror Management Theory, 
one of the most important functions of meaning systems in the form of cultural worldviews is 
to manage individuals’ death anxiety by boosting self-esteem through providing individuals 
with the beliefs that they are valuable contributors to a meaningful universe (Solomon et al., 
1991). This directly predicts that threats to the Islamist worldview such as refutation by 
authorities or counter propaganda operations can trigger violent extremism in the form of 
increased support for military action against foreign countries, or engagement in suicide 
bombing (Pyszczynski et al., 2006).  
Second, the global character of Islamist organizations, which is reflected in their ideological 
target audience (the Umma), is specifically efficient. Indeed, global economic threats are likely 
to cause surges in violent far-right extremism and nationalist-ideologically driven violence 
(Adam-Troian et al., 2019), and even increased nationalistic sentiments due to economic threats 
may be sufficient to generate more threat perception. This is because the link between 
nationalism and prejudice is mediated by increased perceptions of immigrants/minorities as 
both culturally and socio-economically threatening (Badea et al., 2018; Kaya, 2019). This 
perception of threat coming from minorities with immigrant backgrounds regardless of 
ethnicity or religion, then has ripple effects on societies in terms of threat and defence. Increases 
in perception of symbolic threats (Stephan et al., 2000; Verkuyten, 2018) render assimilation 
attempts from cultural minorities even harder (Kunst et al., 2016), and lead to increased 
intergroup conflicts as minorities themselves feel more and more threatened by the native 
majority groups (Doosje et al., 2016; Kteily et al., 2016).   
But the more oppressed minority groups feel, the more likely they become supportive of 
political violence and radical action (including terrorism) in the name of their group to 
demand/defend civil rights or restore a sense of justice (Pfundmair, 2018; Pretus et al., 2018; 
Lobato et al., 2018). In the case of Islamist organizations, their global character ensures that 
they can broadly tap into these sentiments among a pool of Muslim diasporas in a number of 
Western countries. In line with this, research demonstrates a clear causal positive effect of far-
right-wing votes/demonstrations (i.e. anti-Muslim resentment) upon support for ISIS and 
prevalence of ISIS activists across the globe (Mitts, 2019). In return, increased intergroup 
conflicts through acts of terrorism/political violence are further deleterious in terms of 
discrimination, prejudice, greater in-group bias (Fritsche et al., 2013) and increased anti-
immigrant attitudes (Weise et al., 2012). Once again, the global nature of jihadi groups lead 
some of these intergroup conflicts to have geopolitical consequences through increased support 
for war/retaliatory policies, as happened after the 9/11 attacks (Pyszczynski et al., 2006). 
For the radicalizing Muslim youth in diaspora, Islamic space becomes a space in which post-
migrants, or trans-migrants, search for recognition. The allegiance of post-migrant youth into 
Islam is not limited to their parents’ country, but extends to the worldwide Muslim community, 
especially involving solidarity with and interest in struggles such as the Palestinian cause, and 
conflicts in Syria, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon (Cesari, 2003). For instance, the 
Paris banlieues identify with the Palestinians, Iraqis, and Afghans (Roy, 2007: 3). Hence, 
diasporic radical Muslim youth who are affiliated with Islam has a strong political stance rather 
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than a religious one. This is a stance, which goes beyond the separation between religion and 
politics. The reality in Europe today is that not only young radical Muslims, but also other 
Muslim-origin youngsters are becoming politically mobilized to support causes that have less 
to do with faith and more to do with communal solidarity. The manifestation of global Muslim 
solidarity can be described as an identity based on vicarious humiliation: European Muslims 
develop empathy for Muslim victims elsewhere in the world and convince themselves that their 
own exclusion and that of their co-religionists have the same root cause: Western rejection of 
Islam, which partly leads to the co-radicalization of some segments of native and Muslim-origin 
youths. The process of co-radicalization leads some Muslim groups to generate alternative 
forms of politics based on radicalization, violence, religiosity and extremism. This kind of 
politics is what Alistair MacIntyre (1971) calls politics of those excluded initiated by outsider 
groups as opposed to the kind of politics generated by those within. According to MacIntyre 
(1971) there are two forms of politics: politics of those within and politics of those excluded. 
Those within tend to employ legitimate political institutions (parliament, political parties, the 
media) in pursuing their goals, and those excluded resort to honour, culture, ethnicity, religion, 
tradition and sometimes to violence to achieve their goals. It should be noted here that 
MacIntyre does not place culture in the private space; culture is rather inherently located in the 
public space. Therefore, the main motive behind the development of ethno-cultural, religious 
and sometimes violent inclinations by some migrant-origin groups can be perceived as an act 
of alternative form of politics retained to express their concerns in public sphere. Similarly, 
Robert Young (2001) sheds light on the ways in which the discourse of culturalism has become 
salient. Referring to Mao, Fanon, Cabral, Nkrumah, Senghor and many other Tricontinentalists, 
he accurately explicates that culture turns out to be a political strategy for subordinated masses 
to resist ideological infiltrations in both colonial and postcolonial contexts. Thus, the quest for 
identity, authenticity, religiosity and violence should not be reduced to an attempt to essentialize 
the so-called purity. It is rather a form of politics generated by alienated, humiliated and 
excluded subjects. In this sense, Islam is no longer simply a religion for those radical 
individuals, but also a counter hegemonic global political movement, which prompts them to 
stand up to defend the rights of their Muslim brothers against tyranny in Syria, Palestine, 
Kosovo, Kashmir, Iraq, Afghanistan or Lebanon. 
In an age of insecurity, poverty, exclusion, discrimination and violence, those wretched of the 
earth become more engaged in the protection of their honour, which, they believe, is the only 
thing left. In understanding the growing significance of honour and purity for Salafi and 
Wahabbi Muslims and others too, Akbar S. Ahmed (2003) draws our attention to the collapse 
of what Mohammad Ibn Khaldun (1969) once called asabiyya, an Arabic word which refers to 
group loyalty, social cohesion or solidarity. Asabiyya binds groups together through a common 
language, culture and code of behaviour. Ahmed establishes a direct negative correlation 
between asabiyya and the revival of honour. The collapse of asabiyya on a global scale prompts 
Muslims to revitalize honour. Ahmed (2003: 81) claims that asabiyya is collapsing for the 
following reasons: 
Massive urbanization, dramatic demographic changes, a population explosion, large 
scale migrations to the West, the gap between rich and poor, the widespread corruption 
and mismanagement of rulers, the rampant materialism coupled with the low premium 
on education, the crisis of identity, and, perhaps, most significantly new and often alien 
ideas and images, at once seductive and repellent, and instantly communicated from the 
West, ideas and images which challenge traditional values and customs (2003: 81). 
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The collapse of asabiyya also implies for Muslims the breakdown of adl (justice), and ihsan 
(compassion and balance). Global disorder characterized by the lack of asabiyya, adl, and ihsan 
seems to trigger the essentialization of honour and purity by Muslims.  
It takes two to tango: understanding far-right terrorism 
So far, we have noted that similar mechanisms were at play in driving different forms of violent 
extremism. If Islamist extremism is on the rise, we have also seen that right-wing terrorism is 
also increasing. This can be seen in the revival of national-socialist ideologies albeit under a 
more socially acceptable form as embodied by the growing electoral scores of right-wing 
populist parties across Western countries (Kaya, 2019). 
Psychological underpinnings of far-right violent extremism. 
Just as Islamist terrorism is specific in some respects due to socio-historical reasons, so should 
be right-wing terrorism. To better understand, the peculiarities of far-right violent extremism, 
it is necessary to describe some of the tendencies present in these groups. Because our focus is 
on violent political factions, we will leave aside the issue of right-wing populist parties, which 
are already subject to an extensive literature (Kaya, 2019; Tecmen and Kaya, 2019). 
The first type of extreme right-wing factions and the most commonly encountered one stems 
from traditional fascist/Nazi ideological orientations. Such ideologies are currently embodied 
by a variety of organizations. These range from racist groups conducing actions like symbolic 
violence (such as throwing pork meat in hallal areas of supermarkets by Identitarians, 
Generation Identity in France) to outright neo-Nazi groups carrying out terror attacks and 
political assassinations such as Combat 18 in Germany and the UK (CEP, 2019). The ideology 
of these groups revolves around a combination of traditional right-wing authoritarianism 
(Adorno, 1951) emphasizing order and loyalty with racism directed at ethno-cultural, religious 
and/or sexual minorities at large. In the eyes of skinheads, neo-Nazis and Identitarians, Western 
societies are currently under invasion of foreigners (immigrants) who are trying to replace the 
population and establish Sharia law across Europe and the US. This ideology emphasizes the 
nation as a super-ordinate identity. A such, these nationalistic feelings lead to increased 
prejudice against minorities/immigrants (Mummendey et al., 2001; Pettigrew et al., 2007; 
Verkuyten, 2004; see Badea et al., 2018; Mahfud et al., 2016; Kaya, 2019). Indeed, high 
national identifiers express more prejudice, because national identification tends to colour their 
perception of minorities as both realistically and symbolically threatening (Badea et al., 2018; 
Esses et al., 2001; Mahfud et al., 2015), an element that is frequently tapped into by right-wing 
extremist narratives.  
Hostility towards Muslims is a central trope in far-right political rhetoric in the western 
countries. A more specific form of hostility towards settled Muslim communities can be 
observed, particularly during the past decade. Many natives are anxious about increasing 
diversity and immigration in Europe and elsewhere, which provides an increasing support to 
white supremacist groups such as Identitarian movement in Europe, and the Soldiers of Odin 
in many western countries. Anxiety is not solely rooted in economic grievances; support for 
such far-right groups and public hostility to immigration is mainly driven by fears of cultural 
threat. The discriminatory and racist rhetoric towards ‘others’ poses a clear threat to democracy 
and social cohesion in western countries. 
To that end, the Norway terrorist attacks of 22 July 2011 against the government, the civilian 
population and a summer camp of the Workers’ Youth League, the youth organisation 
Norway’s Labour Party, are sad reminders of the dangers of extremism. The perpetrator, Anders 
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Behring Breivik, a 32-year-old Norwegian right-wing extremist, had participated for years in 
debates in Internet forums and had spoken out against Islam and immigration in Europe.1 While 
the emotional effect of Breivik’s massacre continues, another attack took place in Christchurch, 
New Zealand, on 15 March 2019, resulting in the murder of 50 Muslims. A 28-year-old 
Australian man, Brenton Tarrant, reportedly killed the victims as they prayed at two mosques. 
Before the attack, Tarrant reportedly posted a 74-page manifesto titled “The Great 
Replacement” online. In his tract, he wrote that he had only one true inspiration: Anders 
Breivik.2 One similarity between the two massacres was that both murderers had the same 
motive: idealizing the Christian Europe of the past, they both sought to homogenize Europe and 
crush Muslim immigration. Some critical voices are now questioning the rise of right-wing 
populist movements, as they resemble at first sight past experiences of Nazism, Fascism and 
the Franco regime, still alive in collective memory. Furthermore, the rise of populist extremism 
in European politics is challenging democracy with regards to individual rights, collective rights 
and human rights. For instance, citizenship tests being performed in the Netherlands, Germany 
and the UK are designed from the perspective of a single and dominant culture, and undermine 
political and individual rights in so far as they tie those rights to an understanding and full 
acceptance of a single culture.  
Psychologically speaking, very few studies have investigated accurately members of these 
groups, but recent research on alt-right members can give us some clues. A study comparing 
827 Trump voters to 447 members of the US alt-right movement. Alt-right adherents were 
found to be more socially dominant, conspiracist, dehumanizing of their targets and 
authoritarian (Forscher and Kteily, 2019). Moreover, unlike voters of populist parties, or 
Islamist-driven extremists, alt-right members displayed less economic anxiety, indicating fewer 
unfairness concerns, feelings of injustice but probably increased feelings of fear of foreign 
invasion. This is important, because these two different emotions relate in specific ways to 
either challenging the status quo, or enforcing it even harsher respectively (Jost, 2017; Eadeh 
et al., 2018).  
Though these groups sometimes consider themselves victims of tacit complacency of 
politicians towards minorities, they mostly emphasize their power and being the last ‘line’ to 
fight against the upcoming invasion. In addition, while they frequently refer to the Christian 
roots of western civilization, fascist groups are sometimes secular, and use the discourse of 
protection of secular values as a legitimation of their violent action against religious (i.e. 
Muslim) minorities. For instance, in France Laïcité refers to a legal principle, which is supposed 
to guarantee the State and civil servants’ neutrality in terms of religious, political and 
ideological opinions to promote public freedom of expression and religion. In this regard, 
Laïcité can be considered as a type of State ‘secularism’ (Akan, 2009). Since its introduction 
by the 1905 act ‘On the separation between State and Cults’, Laïcité legally forbids civil 
servants reveal their personal ideological views so that citizens can freely express themselves 
without concerns regarding the authorities’ approval or disapproval of their beliefs. Laïcité is 
so embedded in French culture that it has been labelled the ‘cornerstone’ of French republican 
ideology (Kamiejski et al, 2012). Nevertheless, new beliefs about the meaning of Laïcité have 
emerged over the past 30 years (Baubérot, 2010). A growing number of French citizens 
including politicians and journalists now believe that Laïcité applies to every citizen and 
relegates religious expression (such as clothing) to one’s intimate life out of the public sphere 
                                                          
1 The myths that Muslim immigrants are taking over Europe and that multiculturalism is harmful caused the murder 
of seventy-nine individuals by a right-wing extremist, Anders Behring Breivik, in Norway on 22 July 2011. See 
BBC website, 23 July 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14259356, entry date on 15 August 2019. 
2 For further information on this massacre, see https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/opinion/new-zealand-
tarrant-white-supremacist-terror.html [accessed 19 August 2019]. 
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(Vauchez and Valentin, 2014). These beliefs about laicité are not a secular critique of Islam 
(Imhoff and Recker, 2012). On the contrary, they correlate with expression of anti-Muslim and 
anti-immigrant prejudice in general (Kamiejski et al., 2012; Guimond et al., 2014; Roebroeck 
and Guimond, 2015; Troian et al., 2018; Troian, Arciszewski and Apostolidis, 2019). Support 
for Laïcité correlates positively with anti-immigrant attitudes among right-wing individuals, 
while it is the reverse for left-wing individuals (Barthélemy and Michelat, 2007; Kaya, 2019).  
Consequently, it has been demonstrated that laïcité operates as an intergroup ideology – i.e. a 
set of beliefs that regulates one’s orientation towards diversity in intergroup relations (Vorauer 
et al., 2009) in France: equalitarian individuals endorse laïcité, but support for it increases 
among anti-equalitarian individuals under threat (Roebroeck and Guimond, 2017). Analyses 
have also shown that this distorted form of secularism is a component that drives right-wing 
violent extremism in France. Illustrating that phenomenon at the collective level, one of our 
(unpublished) time series analyses revealed that both Google searches and press articles 
containing the word Laïcité followed similar trends than the monthly frequency of racist acts 
and spiked during both 2015 major terror attacks in France (see figure 6, for January and 
November of 2015). 
Figure 6. Chronogram of the monthly frequencies of press articles, google searches containing the word 
Laïcité and monthly frequency of racist acts over the years 2014-2015. 
This ideology was at the core of virulent debates surrounding for instance the wearing of hijab 
by French Muslim women in public places, leading to the 2004 act banning the wearing of 
religious symbols by pupils in public schools (Nugier et al., 2016). Ironically, the ban had the 
effect of decreasing Muslim-background youth identification with the French, increasing their 
identification to their parents’ country of origin and decreasing young Muslim women’s 
enrolment rates in university, thus potentially generating more Islamist radicalization 
(Abdelgadir and Fouka, 2019).  
The discourse of laicité has also been instrumentalized by Marine Le Pen to mainstream her 
party, Front National (Rassemblement National). Marine Le Pen stressed the ‘Christian roots’ 
of France in the 2017 presidential campaign, as did François Fillon and (before his defeat) 
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Nicolas Sarkozy (Brubaker, 2017: 1198). In this way, secularism, or rather laicité, has become 
central to the FN’s portrayal of Muslims as the ‘other’. This is a conventional view, which 
exploits the relationship between Islam and Christianity, constructed within the Huntingtonian 
clash of civilisations approach. As evidenced in Brubaker’s analysis, Le Pen’s main asset has 
been the principle of laicité, a remnant of the French Revolution: 
Given the distinctive French tradition of laicité (or secularity), this might seem 
unsurprising. But the embrace of laicité by the Front National under Marline Le Pen is 
new. This shift was driven by the preoccupation with Islam. Le Pen infamously 
compared Friday prayers by Muslims in the streets of certain parts of Paris to the 
German occupation, and she made the spread of Halal food a central campaign theme 
in the last presidential election. In the current campaign, she has called for banning the 
headscarf – along with the kippa and, for an appearance of equality, “large crosses”– in 
all public settings, including stores, streets, workplaces, and public transportation. Parts 
of the mainstream right have adopted a similarly assertive secularist posture. In the name 
of laicité, for example, the mayors of several towns controlled by Sarkozy’s party 
announced last year that pork-free menu options – previously made available to 
accommodate Muslim and Jewish students – would no longer be offered in public 
schools (Brubaker 2017: 1201). 
Thus, the FN in this case does not single out Islam and Muslims, but rather exploits the principle 
of laicité to appear impartial and thereby legitimise Muslims’ isolation from the public sphere. 
Nonetheless, Marine Le Pen has directly targeted Islam and the ‘culture of Muslims’. In 2015, 
she used recent terrorist attacks to single out Muslims, particularly Syrians, stating “France and 
the French are no longer safe” due to the influx of refugees, and terrorists entering France with 
Syrian passports.3 
To further illustrate this, on 5 February 2017 in Lyon, during a campaign speech, Le Pen used 
a more security-based approach in deploying politics of fear. She stated that, “we do not want 
to live under the yoke of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism… Islamic fundamentalism is 
attacking us at home”. Complementing this idea of ‘invasion’ and ‘attack’, military terms which 
connote a hypothetical ‘war’, Le Pen said that “mass immigration” ‘had allowed Islamic 
fundamentalism, an ideological “enemy of France” to settle on its territory.’4 Moreover, Le Pen 
clearly opposes the idea that France/French nationals should “adapt [to Islam], which cannot be 
reasonable or conceivable”, as France was built on Christian heritage.5 Therefore, the 
antagonism results not only from an assumed failure of the republic, but also from a struggle 
for dominance between Christian and Islamic civilizational identities.  
Besides this first type of extreme right-wing groups, which emphasize racism and a somewhat 
secular form of extremism, other terrorist groups in the right-wing sphere can be viewed as 
more religiously inspired. For example, some groups, though ‘secular’, refer to pre-Christian 
European times, emphasizing paganism and glorifying ancient warrior tribal lifestyles such as 
the images portrayed by the Soldiers of Odin in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, 
Canada and elsewhere.6 Moreover, the EU and US both have their share of Christian-inspired 
                                                          
3https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/world/europe/marine-le-pens-anti-islam-message-gains-influence-in-
france.html [accessed 30 July 2019]. 
4http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/marine-le-pen-front-national-speech-campaign-launch-
islamic-fundamentalism-french-elections-a7564051.html [accessed 30 July 2019]. 
5 Ibid. 
6 For further discussion on the Soldiers of Odin see The Independent (27 February 2016), available at 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/norwegian-islamists-form-soldiers-of-allah-in-response-to-
soldiers-of-odin-patrols-a6899801.html. This is a remarkable media coverage depicting the process of co-
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movements, such as Civitas in France and the Army of God in the US, or other more recent 
active groups. Their ideological narrative seems to be more similar to that of the Islamists. 
Indeed, these groups emphasize the decay of current modern society. To combat it, these groups 
typically protest against art they consider blasphemous and progressive policies they perceive 
as destructive. As such, religious right-wing extremists openly combat sexual minorities, 
abortion laws and secular policies aimed at restraining the influence of religion in the public 
sphere as well as allowing blasphemy through freedom of expression (Bowman-Grieve, 2009).  
Though these groups have been less active recently in carrying out terror attacks targeting ethnic 
minorities in New-Zealand or the US for instance, right-wing religiously inspired terrorism 
remains a potent threat because of the specific cognitive mechanisms religiosity taps into. These 
pertain to sacralization of values, which increase intentions to self-sacrifice for a cause (Atran, 
2016) and increased conspiracist mind-set, which is a direct predictor of violent intentions and 
ethnic prejudice (Oliver and Wood, 2014; Jolley et al., 2019; Jolley et al., in press). For these 
reasons, religiously inspired terrorism - including Islamist terrorism - is still deadlier than other 
forms of terrorism (Sosis et al., 2012).  
Nativisation and Islamization of Radicalism 
The neo-liberal age appears to be leading to the Nativisation of Radicalism among some groups 
of disenchanted native populations, while leading to the Islamization of Radicalism among 
some segments of disenchanted migrant-origin populations. The common denominator of these 
groups is that they are downwardly mobile and inclined towards radicalization. Existing studies 
have revealed findings that place the two groups into separate ethno-cultural and religious boxes 
(Kepel, 2017; Roy, 2007, 2017). Some social groups belonging to the majority nations are more 
inclined to express their unhappiness at insecurity and social-economic deprivation through the 
language of Islamophobia. Several decades ago, Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) stated that 
social-political discontent is likely to lead people to anti-Semitism, xenophobia, racism, 
regionalism, supernationalism, fascism, and anti-cosmopolitanism. If Lipset’s timely 
intervention in the 1950s is transposed to the contemporary age, it could be argued that 
Islamophobia has become one of the paths followed by the socio-economically and politically 
dismayed. An Islamophobic discourse has resonated loudly in the last two decades following 
the 9/11, and its users have been heard by both local and international communities, although 
their concern has not necessarily resulted from matters related to Muslims. In other words, 
Muslims have become the most popular scapegoats in many parts of the world for any 
troublesome situation. For almost two decades, Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants 
have been perceived by some sections of the European public as a financial burden, and 
virtually never an opportunity, for member states. Muslim-origin immigrants tend to be 
negatively associated with, among many other issues, illegality, crime, violence, drug abuse, 
radicalism, fundamentalism, and conflict (Kaya, 2015). Islamophobia has certainly become a 
discursive tactic widely exploited by right-wing populist parties, social movements and 
especially far-right groups in Europe affected by the financial and refugee crises. 
Based on an empirical analysis conducted by Kaya and Kayaoğlu (2017), it was revealed that 
individual indicators of anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe are mostly related to social-economic 
and political factors rather than ethno-cultural and religious variables. Using data from the 
World Values Survey and the European Values Survey for the period between 1994 and 20097, 
                                                          
radicalization Norway, which leads Muslim-origin youngsters to form the “Soldiers of Allah” in response to the 
Soldiers of Odin. 
7 The empirical analysis could not be extended further, as the relevant question on Islamophobia is not available 
for the waves after 2009. 
The revival of extreme-right wing terrorism: an anthropological and psychological perspective| 17 
 
it was found that increasing age, nationalism and being male has a positive impact on the 
probability of anti-Muslim and right-wing populist behaviour. Conversely, religiosity, 
education level and the size of town have a decreasing impact on the predicted probability. 
Native male individuals residing in smaller towns in the periphery have, with increasing age, 
nationalist sentiments, lower education, and weak religious affiliations, potentially more 
propensity towards Islamophobic and far-right rhetoric. Oppositely, native individuals – 
especially females – with higher education, young age, and/or stronger religious affiliation are 
less associated with Islamophobia and far-right political discourse. 
It has also been found that European cities with a considerable number of Muslim-origin 
population are less likely to produce Islamophobic and far-right stances. Paris, Berlin, 
Amsterdam, Brussels, London, and Rome are some good examples of cities where an 
Islamophobic rhetoric is not widely embraced by their residents. Hence, one could argue that 
the premises of inter-group contact theory, predicting that contact between groups can 
effectively reduce negative attitudes towards out-groups, are mostly accurate (Allport, 1954; 
Pettigrew, 1998; Brewer and Brown, 1998). The question of whether anti-Muslim prejudice 
among the affiliates of far-right groups in European cities is different from a general prejudice 
towards out-groups in a population is an important question. There are different determinants 
contributing to the construction of anti-Muslim prejudice in the West: lack of education, 
growing mediocracy, lack of inter-group contact, essentialization of stereotypes by mainstream 
media, growing sense of insecurity, growing age, gendered differences, and growing populist 
forms of governance. 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, there is a spectre circulating in the West, and it is called ‘radicalization’. This 
kind of radicalization affects both native social groups and migrant-origin social groups, who 
have been equally hit by the processes of deindustrialization, globalization, social-economic 
deprivation, alienation, exclusion and humiliation over the last three decades. What is striking 
is that although both groups are relatively similar in terms of social-economic and political 
status, which alienates them from mainstream political and societal trajectories, they are 
inclined to use Islam, in one way or another, as an outlet for their social, economic, political 
and psychological discontent against the processes of globalization. While the former group is 
more inclined to navigate in the public space by exploiting and employing an Islamophobic 
discourse, the latter is more associated with an Islamist discourse (Kimmel, 2003; Köttig et al., 
2017). Therefore, various segments of the European public – be they native populations or 
Muslim-migrant-origin populations –have been alienated and swept away by the flows of 
globalization, likely to appear in the form of deindustrialization, mobility, migration, tourism, 
social-economic inequalities, international trade, ‘greedy bankers’, robots making factory jobs 
obsolete, and emigration of youngsters (Kaya, 2019). These segments are more inclined to adopt 
one of the two mainstream political discourses that have become pivotal alongside the rise of 
the civilizational rhetoric since the early 1990s: Islamophobism and Islamism.  
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